Already a subscriber?
MADCAD.com Free Trial
Sign up for a 3 day free trial to explore the MADCAD.com interface, PLUS access the
2009 International Building Code to see how it all works.
If you like to setup a quick demo, let us know at support@madcad.com
or +1 800.798.9296 and we will be happy to schedule a webinar for you.
Security check
Please login to your personal account to use this feature.
Please login to your authorized staff account to use this feature.
Are you sure you want to empty the cart?
BS EN IEC 61784-3:2021 Industrial communication networks. Profiles - Functional safety fieldbuses. General rules and profile definitions, 2021
- undefined [Go to Page]
- Annex ZA(normative)Normative references to international publicationswith their corresponding European publications
- English [Go to Page]
- CONTENTS
- FOREWORD
- 0 Introduction [Go to Page]
- 0.1 General
- Figures [Go to Page]
- Figure 1 – Relationships of IEC 61784-3 with other standards (machinery)
- Figure 2 – Relationships of IEC 61784-3 with other standards (process)
- 0.2 Use of extended assessment methods in Edition 4
- 0.3 Patent declaration
- Figure 3 – Transitions from Ed. 2 to Ed. 4 and future Ed. 5 assessment methods
- 1 Scope
- 2 Normative references
- 3 Terms, definitions, symbols, abbreviated terms and conventions [Go to Page]
- 3.1 Terms and definitions
- 3.2 Symbols and abbreviated terms [Go to Page]
- 3.2.1 Abbreviated terms
- 3.2.2 Symbols
- 4 Conformance
- 5 Basics of safety-related fieldbus systems [Go to Page]
- 5.1 Safety function decomposition
- 5.2 Communication system [Go to Page]
- 5.2.1 General
- Figure 4 – Safety communication as a part of a safety function [Go to Page]
- 5.2.2 IEC 61158 fieldbuses
- 5.2.3 Communication channel types
- Figure 5 – Example model of a functional safety communication system [Go to Page]
- 5.2.4 Safety function response time
- 5.3 Communication errors [Go to Page]
- 5.3.1 General
- 5.3.2 Corruption
- Figure 6 – Example of safety function response time components [Go to Page]
- 5.3.3 Unintended repetition
- 5.3.4 Incorrect sequence
- 5.3.5 Loss
- 5.3.6 Unacceptable delay
- 5.3.7 Insertion
- 5.3.8 Masquerade
- 5.3.9 Addressing
- 5.4 Deterministic remedial measures [Go to Page]
- 5.4.1 General
- 5.4.2 Sequence number
- 5.4.3 Time stamp
- 5.4.4 Time expectation
- 5.4.5 Connection authentication
- 5.4.6 Feedback message
- 5.4.7 Data integrity assurance
- 5.4.8 Redundancy with cross checking
- 5.4.9 Different data integrity assurance systems
- 5.5 Typical relationships between errors and safety measures
- 5.6 Communication phases
- Tables [Go to Page]
- Table 1 – Overview of the effectiveness ofthe various measures on the possible errors
- 5.7 FSCP implementation aspects
- 5.8 Models for estimation of the total residual error rate [Go to Page]
- 5.8.1 Applicability
- Figure 7 – Conceptual FSCP protocol model
- Figure 8 – FSCP implementation aspects [Go to Page]
- 5.8.2 General models for black channel communications
- 5.8.3 Identification of generic safety properties
- Figure 9 – Black channel from an FSCP perspective [Go to Page]
- 5.8.4 Assumptions for residual error rate calculations
- 5.8.5 Residual error rates
- 5.8.6 Data integrity
- 5.8.7 Authenticity
- Figure 10 – Model for authentication considerations
- Figure 11 – Fieldbus and internal address errors [Go to Page]
- 5.8.8 Timeliness
- Figure 12 – Example of slowly increasing message latency
- Figure 13 – Example of an active network element failure [Go to Page]
- 5.8.9 Masquerade
- 5.8.10 Calculation of the total residual error rates
- Figure 14 – Example application 1 (m = 4)
- Figure 15 – Example application 2 (m = 2) [Go to Page]
- 5.8.11 Total residual error rate and SIL
- 5.8.12 Configuration and parameterization for an FSCP
- Table 2 – Typical relationship of residual error rate to SIL
- Table 3 – Typical relationship of residual error on demand to SIL
- Figure 16 – Example of configuration and parameterization procedures for FSCP
- 5.9 Relationship between functional safety and security
- 5.10 Boundary conditions and constraints [Go to Page]
- 5.10.1 Electrical safety
- 5.10.2 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
- 5.11 Installation guidelines
- 5.12 Safety manual
- 5.13 Safety policy
- 6 Communication Profile Family 1 (Foundation™ Fieldbus) – Profiles for functional safety
- 7 Communication Profile Family 2 (CIP™) and Family 16 (SERCOS®) – Profiles for functional safety
- 8 Communication Profile Family 3 (PROFIBUS™, PROFINET™) – Profiles for functional safety
- 9 Communication Profile Family 6 (INTERBUS®) – Profiles for functional safety [Go to Page]
- Table 4 – Overview of profile identifier usable for FSCP 6/7
- 10 Communication Profile Family 8 (CC-Link™) – Profiles for functional safety [Go to Page]
- 10.1 Functional Safety Communication Profile 8/1
- 10.2 Functional Safety Communication Profile 8/2
- 11 Communication Profile Family 12 (EtherCAT™) – Profiles for functional safety
- 12 Communication Profile Family 13 (Ethernet POWERLINK™) – Profiles for functional safety
- 13 Communication Profile Family 14 (EPA®) – Profiles for functional safety
- 14 Communication Profile Family 17 (RAPIEnet™) – Profiles for functional safety
- 15 Communication Profile Family 18 (SafetyNET p™ Fieldbus) – Profiles for functional safety
- Annexes [Go to Page]
- Annex A (informative)Example functional safety communication models [Go to Page]
- A.1 General
- A.2 Model A (single message, channel and FAL, redundant SCLs)
- A.3 Model B (full redundancy)
- Figure A.1 – Model A [Go to Page]
- A.4 Model C (redundant messages, FALs and SCLs, single channel)
- A.5 Model D (redundant messages and SCLs, single channel and FAL)
- Figure A.2 – Model B
- Figure A.3 – Model C
- Figure A.4 – Model D
- Annex B (normative)Safety communication channel modelusing CRC-based error checking [Go to Page]
- B.1 Overview
- B.2 Channel model for calculations
- Figure B.1 – Binary symmetric channel (BSC) [Go to Page]
- B.3 Bit error probability Pe
- Figure B.2 – Block codes for error detection
- Table B.1 – Example dependency dmin and block bit length n [Go to Page]
- B.4 Cyclic redundancy checking [Go to Page]
- B.4.1 General
- B.4.2 Requirements for methods to calculate RCRC
- Figure B.3 – Example of a block with a message part and a CRC signature
- Figure B.4 – Proper and improper CRC polynomials
- Annex C (informative)Structure of technology-specific parts
- Table C.1 – Common subclause structure for technology-specific parts
- Annex D (informative)Assessment guideline [Go to Page]
- D.1 Overview
- D.2 Channel types [Go to Page]
- D.2.1 General
- D.2.2 Black channel
- D.2.3 White channel
- D.3 Data integrity considerations for white channel approaches [Go to Page]
- D.3.1 General
- D.3.2 Models B and C
- D.3.3 Models A and D
- D.4 Verification of safety measures [Go to Page]
- D.4.1 General
- Figure D.1 – Basic Markov model [Go to Page]
- [Go to Page]
- D.4.2 Implementation
- D.4.3 Default safety action
- D.4.4 Safe state
- D.4.5 Transmission errors
- D.4.6 Safety reaction and response times
- D.4.7 Combination of measures
- D.4.8 Absence of interference
- D.4.9 Additional fault causes (white channel)
- D.4.10 Reference test beds and operational conditions
- D.4.11 Conformance tester
- Annex E (informative)Examples of implicit vs. explicit FSCP safety measures [Go to Page]
- E.1 General
- E.2 Example fieldbus message with safety PDUs
- E.3 Model with completely explicit safety measures
- Figure E.1 – Example safety PDUs embedded in a fieldbus message
- Figure E.2 – Model with completely explicit safety measures [Go to Page]
- E.4 Model with explicit A-code and implicit T-code safety measures
- E.5 Model with explicit T-code and implicit A-code safety measures
- Figure E.3 – Model with explicit A-code and implicit T-code safety measures [Go to Page]
- E.6 Model with split explicit and implicit safety measures
- Figure E.4 – Model with explicit T-code and implicit A-code safety measures
- Figure E.5 – Model with split explicit and implicit safety measures [Go to Page]
- E.7 Model with completely implicit safety measures
- E.8 Addition to Annex B – impact of implicit codes on properness
- Figure E.6 – Model with completely implicit safety measures
- Annex F (informative)Legacy models for estimation of the total residual error rate [Go to Page]
- F.1 General
- F.2 Calculation of the residual error rate
- Figure F.1 – Example application 1 (m = 4)
- Table F.1 – Definition of items used for calculation of the residual error rates [Go to Page]
- F.3 Total residual error rate and SIL
- Figure F.2 – Example application 2 (m = 2)
- Table F.2 – Typical relationship of residual error rate to SIL
- Table F.3 – Typical relationship of residual error on demand to SIL
- Annex G (informative)Implicit data safety mechanisms for IEC 61784�3 functionalsafety communication profiles (FSCPs) [Go to Page]
- G.1 Overview
- G.2 Basic principles
- G.3 Problem statement: constant values for implicit data
- Figure G.1 – FSCP with implicit transmission of authenticityand/or timeliness codes
- Figure G.2 – Example of an incorrect transmission with multiple error causes
- Figure G.3 – Impact of errors in implicit data on the residual error probability [Go to Page]
- G.4 RP for FSCPs with random, uniformly distributed errimpl [Go to Page]
- G.4.1 General
- G.4.2 Uniform distribution within the interval [0;2i-1], i ≥ r
- G.4.3 Uniform distribution in the interval [1;2r-1], i = r
- G.5 General case
- G.6 Calculation of PID
- Annex H (informative)Residual error probability for example CRC codes(tables for verification of calculation methods) [Go to Page]
- H.1 Overview
- H.2 Example of a 32-bit CRC
- Table H.1 – Residual error probabilities (RCRC1) for example CRC32 polynomial
- Figure H.1 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 32-bit CRC – result 1)
- Figure H.2 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 32-bit CRC – result 2)
- Figure H.3 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 32-bit CRC – result 3)
- Figure H.4 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 32-bit CRC – result 4)
- Figure H.5 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 32-bit CRC – result 5)
- Figure H.6 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 32-bit CRC – result 6) [Go to Page]
- H.3 Example of a 16-bit CRC
- Table H.2 – Residual error probabilities (RCRC2) for example CRC16 polynomial
- Figure H.7 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 16-bit CRC – result 1)
- Figure H.8 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 16-bit CRC – result 2)
- Figure H.9 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 16-bit CRC – result 3)
- Figure H.10 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 16-bit CRC – result 4) [Go to Page]
- H.4 Conclusion
- Figure H.11 – Residual error probabilities (example of a 16-bit CRC – result 5)
- Figure H.12 – Example 1 of improper polynomial
- Figure H.13 – Example 2 of improper polynomial
- Bibliography [Go to Page]